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1. Introduction
It is a pleasure to provide this comment on David Gantz’s and Simon Schropp’s
insightful paper on the WTO Panel Report in Turkey–Measures Aﬀecting the
Importation of Rice.1 As Gantz and Schropp concentrate on the aspects of the
Panel Report addressing issues of the role of prima facie proof and the litigation
process, I will do likewise in this comment.
1.1 Prima facie case and the burden of proof
1.1.1 The issue before the panel
As the authors explain concisely, the issue of how a WTO panel should determine
whether the complainant has made a prima facie case was raised at the interim
review stage in Turkey–Rice. In the interim report, the Panel stated that in order
to assess whether the United States had met its initial burden to make a prima
facie case, the Panel would consider the evidence on record, as submitted by both
parties. In its comments on the interim review, the United States argued that the
Panel ﬁnd that the complainant had made a prima facie case, thereby shifting the
burden of proof to the defending party, only if the complaining party has provided
suﬃcient evidence and argumentation.2
The views expressed in this comment, as well as any errors, are those of the author alone. I would like to
thank Henrik Horn, Petros Mavroidis and the American Law Institute (ALI) for inviting me to participate
in this project and to provide this comment.
1 Panel Report, Turkey – Measures Aﬀecting the Importation of Rice, WT/DS334/R, adopted 22
October 2007) (hereinafter ‘Panel Report’ or ‘Turkey–Rice ’).
2 Panel Report, paras. 5.9–5.11.
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In response, the Panel referred to its obligation under Article 11 of the DSU
to make an objective assessment of the facts of the case as implying that the
Panel is ‘bound to consider all the evidence on the record’, including the evidence
submitted by both parties and evidence obtained by the Panel itself under Article
13.1 of the DSU.3 In the Panel’s view, this obligation did not relieve the com-
plaining party of the burden to make a prima facie case.4 Nevertheless, the Panel’s
terminology in the ﬁnal report remains less than clear: it says that ‘ the initial
burden of proof rests upon the United States, as a complainant, to establish its
prima facie case’.5 However, the Panel then stated that in order to assess whether
the United States has met this initial burden, the Panel must consider ‘ if the
evidence on the record, as submitted by both parties ’ is suﬃcient to raise a pre-
liminary presumption_ Only if the evidence on the record is suﬃcient for the
panel to conclude that the United States has made a prima facie case, would the
burden then be shifted onto Turkey to adequately rebut the United States’ alle-
gations’.6 While the panel did not cite to it, the Panel’s ﬁnding was consistent
with that of the Appellate Body in India–Quantitative Restrictions, in which the
Appellate Body considered it ‘not objectionable that the Panel took into account,
in assessing whether the United States had made a prima facie case, the responses
of India to the United States ’.7 This notion that a determination of whether a
complainant has made a prima facie case should involve an analysis of evidence
submitted by both parties raises an important question as to the nature and role of
a prima facie ﬁnding in WTO dispute-settlement proceedings, to which I shall
return.
Dissatisﬁed with the United States’ position that the evidence submitted by
Turkey should not be relevant to the issue of whether a prima facie case has been
made, the authors compare the United States’ view of how the litigation process
should unfold (Scenario 1) with the Panel’s (Scenario 2) and the authors’ own view
(Scenario 3) of how the burden of proof should shift as the Panel resolves the
dispute. It is striking that the authors’ approach appears to accept without ques-
tion that Panels will conduct some sort of sequential, or at least two-step, analysis
of the evidence and argument submitted by the parties, including a prima facie
analysis and a subsequent ﬁnal analysis. This is the second issue that I shall ad-
dress : whether such a sequential process actually exists in either the law or practice
of WTO dispute-settlement proceedings.
3 Panel Report, para. 5.12. Article 13.1 of the DSU authorizes panels to seek information and technical
advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate.
4 Ibid.
5 Panel Report, para. 7.59.
6 Ibid.
7 Appellate Body Report, India–Quantitative Restrictions, para. 142.
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1.1.2 The nature of a prima facie determination
The literal meaning of the term prima facie is ‘at ﬁrst sight’.8 As a legal term,
it is generally understood, at least in the common-law tradition, to refer to such
evidence or argument as is suﬃcient to sustain a judgement in favour of the com-
plaining party unless it is rebutted or contradicted.9 In municipal systems, this may
imply the existence of a procedural step in litigation whereby the court will, if the
complaining party fails to make a prima facie case, dismiss the case without re-
quiring the defendant to produce exculpatory evidence and argument.10 In such
systems, defending parties have every reason to try to seek dismissal of the action
at a preliminary stage on the grounds that the complaining party has failed to make
a prima facie case. It may also imply the existence of rules of discovery, whereby
the complainant can compel the defendant to produce evidence. The existence of
these rules provides a justiﬁcation for imposing a high standard of prima facie
proof on a complainant.
The WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (the ‘DSU’) does not refer to a prima facie case or to the allocation of the
burden of proof. Article 11 simply requires the Panel ‘to make an objective as-
sessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of
the case’.11 While Panels have ‘the right to seek information and technical advice
from any individual or body which [they] deem appropriate ’, they are not required
to do so. These provisions presume to some extent that Panels will have complete
information before them. Thus, ‘ it is often said that the idea of peaceful settlement
of disputes before international tribunals is largely based on the premise of co-
operation of the litigating parties ’.12 Absent perfect cooperation, however, it be-
comes necessary for Panels, in fulﬁlling their own responsibility to conduct an
objective assessment, to assign to the parties responsibility for the production of
facts and to impose consequences for any failure to do so.
To do so, Panels and the Appellate Body have had recourse to the terminology
used in municipal systems to describe the burden of proof, including the concept of
a prima facie case. Thus, in EC–Hormones, the Appellate Body said that a prima
facie case is one which, ‘ in the absence of eﬀective refutation by the defending
8 See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th edn (West Publishing, 1979), p. 1071 (‘At ﬁrst sight; on the
ﬁrst appearance; on the face of it ; so far as can be judged from the ﬁrst disclosure’).
9 For a detailed discussion of the issues relating to prima facie proof in both municipal systems and in
WTO dispute settlement, see Yasuhei Taniguchi, ‘Understanding the Concept of Prima Facie Proof in
WTO Dispute Settlement’, in Merit E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson, and Alan Yanovich (eds.), The WTO:
Governance, Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries (New York, Juris Publishing, 2008), p. 553.
A more conceptual discussion of the topic can be found in the same volume: see David Unterhalter, ‘The
Burden of Proof in Dispute Settlement’, ibid., p. 543.
10 See, e.g., Taniguchi, ‘Understanding the Concept of Prima Facie Proof ’, pp. 556–564.
11 DSU Article 11.
12 Panel Report, Argentina–Textiles and Apparel, para. 6.40, quoted in Panel Report, para. 7.7.
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party, requires a Panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining
party presenting the prima facie case ’.13
This deﬁnition of a prima facie case as one to be evaluated in ‘the absence of
eﬀective refutation by the defending party’ implies that, as the United States
argued in Turkey–Rice, the determination of whether the complaining party has
made a prima facie case must be based only on the evidence or argument submitted
by the complaining party. It is hard to see how Panels can properly determine the
strength of the complainant’s case ‘ in the absence of eﬀective refutation by the
defending party’ if they may take evidence submitted by the responding party into
account in doing so. To the contrary, the evaluation contemplated by the Appellate
Body in India–Quantitative Restrictions and the Panel in Turkey–Rice seems more
like an objective assessment of all the evidence, not a preliminary assessment at any
kind of ‘ﬁrst sight’.
Finally, the practice of making prima facie determinations on the basis of
evidence submitted by both sides would suggest that the amount of evidence the
complainant needs to submit to establish a prima facie case can be increased to
respond to the evidence submitted by the respondent. The Appellate Body has said
that ‘precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence’ will be required to
make a prima facie case ‘will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision
to provision, and case to case’.14 It is not clear that the Appellate Body envisaged
that the quantity of evidence needed to establish a prima facie case would be
aﬀected by the evidence provided by the responding party. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable to assume that if Panels are permitted to take the evidence submitted by
the responding party into account, the amount of evidence required of the com-
plaining party to make its prima facie case may be correspondingly greater. Again,
this suggests that the prima facie determination is something more than a deter-
mination ‘at ﬁrst sight’. In addition, it makes little practical sense to talk of the
prima facie case as serving to shift the burden of providing evidence if that shift
takes place after the responding party has already provided evidence.
1.1.3 How prima facie determinations are used in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings
In WTO dispute settlement, Panels almost never rule on claims ‘at ﬁrst sight ’.
There is no formal system of preliminary rulings on whether the complainant has
failed to meet its burden to make a prima facie case. Complaining Members do not
beneﬁt from any rules of ‘discovery’ they can use to compel the production of
evidence from the other party. In the absence of rules of discovery, it makes less
sense to impose a requirement on complainants that they meet a preliminary
threshold of proof that could be fatal to their cases. Similarly, defending Members
do not have the option of withholding their defence, making a motion that the
13 Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, para. 104. See also, Appellate Body Report,
Canada–Aircraft, para. 192.
14 Appellate Body Report, US–Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
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complainant has not made a prima facie case, and, if that motion is not successful,
subsequently submitting their defences. There are no strict time limits on the
submission of evidence. Frequently, parties to the dispute continue to provide
evidence, including in response to questions from the Panel, until after the second
meeting of the Panel with the parties.
Panels occasionally rule that the complaining Member has failed to make a
prima facie case. In practice, however, it can be diﬃcult to discern in what sense
such a prima facie ruling diﬀers from a ﬁnal or substantive ruling. To take just one
example, in Mexico–Steel Pipes and Tubes, the Panel ruled that Guatemala had
failed to make a prima facie case regarding a claim that Mexico had not conducted
a proper causation analysis in an anti-dumping investigation.15 The Panel found
that Guatemala’s allegations were based on a misunderstanding of the factual
evidence. However, it did so in its ﬁnal report and after apparently after con-
sideration of all of the evidence and argument submitted by both sides, including
both argument and evidence submitted by Mexico in response to a speciﬁc factual
question posed by the Panel.16 In these circumstances, it is not clear how the Panel’s
ﬁnding can properly be characterized as a ﬁnding that Guatemala failed to make
a prima facie case, rather than a fully ﬂedged substantive ﬁnding based on an
‘objective assessment of the facts of the case ’ within the meaning of Article 11 of
the DSU. This ambiguity is perhaps consistent with the Appellate Body’s rulings
that Panels are not required to make express ﬁndings that the complaining party
has discharged its burden of making a prima facie case before they consider the
evidence submitted by the defending Member.17 But the fact remains that the
consequences are entirely the same regardless of whether the ﬁnding is considered
as a prima facie or ﬁnal determination: Guatemala did not prevail on this
particular claim.
There are also practical reasons why the concept of a prima facie determination
ﬁts uneasily into dispute-settlement practice and procedure. Panel working pro-
cedures generally provide that parties should make requests for preliminary rulings
not later than in their ﬁrst written submission. However, the working procedures
typically also provide that parties must submit all factual evidence to the Panel no
later than during the ﬁrst substantive meeting, although parties may continue to
provide rebuttal evidence in subsequent submissions or in responses to questions
from the Panel. In theory, this means that a party should request a preliminary
ruling that the complaining Member has failed to make a prima facie case before
the complaining Member’s deadline to provide the evidence necessary to make
that case has expired.
The situation is, of course, somewhat diﬀerent in cases where the defending
Member chooses not to submit evidence. In such cases, the question arises more
15 Panel Report,Mexico–Pipes and Tubes, para. 7.362.
16 Ibid., para. 7.357.
17 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Thailand–H-Beams, para. 134.
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clearly whether, in the words of the Appellate Body in EC–Hormones, ‘ in the
absence of eﬀective refutation by the defending party’ the case presented by the
complainant ‘requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the com-
plaining party’.18 In these situations, Panels have described their obligation as be-
ing to satisfy themselves that the complainant ‘has established a prima facie case of
violation, and notably that it has presented ‘‘evidence and argument_ suﬃcient
to identify the challenged measure and its basic import, identify the relevant WTO
provision and obligation contained therein, and explain the basis for the claimed
inconsistency of the measure with that provision’’ ’.19 In these cases, Panels may
truly be said to be ruling on the basis of a prima facie standard, although, again,
this is done as a ﬁnal ruling rather than a preliminary ruling.20 It should also
be noted that, as a practical matter, it is much simpler to ﬁnd in favour of the
complainant where the defendant does not oppose the claim than to rule against
the complainant on a prima facie basis where the defendant actually contests the
claim.
1.1.4 How this impacts the authors’ analysis of the litigation process
The above discussion suggests that the concept of a prima facie case is problematic
in WTO dispute-settlement proceedings. The approach of the Panel in Turkey–
Rice (and the Appellate Body in India–Quantitative Restrictions) appears to con-
fuse the concept of a determination ‘at ﬁrst sight ’ that, in the Appellate Body’s
view, serves to shift the burden of proof with a ﬁnal substantive determination
based on an objective analysis of all the evidence. As noted above, it is problematic
to speak of the burden of proof shifting after the responding party has already
provided evidence. The Turkey–Rice Panel may have been concerned that it could
not reconcile making a prima facie determination based only on the evidence
submitted by the complainant with its obligation under DSU Article 11 to make an
objective assessment of all the evidence. I think the two could have been reconciled
in the manner suggested by the United States, especially if the prima facie deter-
mination really is a preliminary, at ﬁrst sight, evaluation, as it appears to be in
most legal systems, separate from the ﬁnal assessment of the claim.
Moreover, the reality of current dispute-settlement practice and procedure is
that there is no two-tier or sequential procedure. As explained above, there are
generally no rulings on preliminary motions. The parties submit evidence and
argument, on their own initiative and in response to questions from the Panel. The
party that asserts a fact has the burden of proving it. Panels have the authority to
make appropriate inferences regarding the failure of a party to provide necessary
information. At the end of the process, Panels normally make a single objective
assessment of the case, although occasionally describing their rulings as prima facie
18 Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, para. 104. See also, Appellate Body Report,
Canada–Aircraft, para. 192.
19 Panel Report, US–Shrimp (Ecuador), para. 7.11.
20 In US–Shrimp (Ecuador), the parties agreed to accelerated procedures.
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rulings. Thus, Panels deliberate on whether complaining parties have made their
prima facie case at the same time as they make their ﬁnal substantive determi-
nation on the complaining parties’ claims. Accordingly, the current WTO liti-
gation process is probably more straightforward than any of the scenarios
described by the authors.
Accordingly, it may reasonably be asked whether the use by Panels of the
terminology of a prima facie case is necessary or helpful to understanding the
litigation process or how Panels fulﬁl their obligation under DSU Article 11 to
make an objective assessment of all the facts. Where the parties submit their evi-
dence over the course of the proceedings without deadlines, rules of discovery, and
any real system of procedural motions, and Panels conduct a single ‘objective
assessment of the matter before it ’ and issue a single set of rulings in the form of
the Panel Report, the concept of a prima facie determination may be superﬂuous.
In WTO dispute settlement, therefore, it may be particularly apt to suggest that the
prima facie determination shifts the burden of proof primarily in the mind of the
trier of fact (i.e., the Panel).21
So how does this aﬀect the litigation process proposed by the authors (Scen-
ario 3)? For the reasons explained above, the two-step process envisaged by the
authors would necessitate some changes to current Panel practice and procedure.
However, it is not clear exactly what procedural steps or consequences the authors
envisage as resulting from the prima facie stage. The authors state that under their
scenario, ‘objective panel assessment ’ would run ‘in perfect parallel to the parties ’
submissions and testimonials’, but do not specify what procedural or other
consequences would ﬂow from the Panel making ﬁndings earlier in the process.
One possibility may be that prior to their ﬁnal deliberations, Panels would notify
parties of any failures or gaps in the evidence provided and permit the parties to
remedy the deﬁciency. It could be argued, however, that Panels already do this :
while the authors call for more interventionist Panels, it is not uncommon for
Panels to pose more than 50 questions to the parties following each Panel meeting.
The authors also suggest that under their scenario, Panels would incur higher
costs in terms of the time taken to complete reports and ﬁnancially for the parties
involved. I agree with the authors that there may not be a groundswell of support
for this! The Panel process is already, on average, over 10 months,22 almost twice
the six-month period contemplated by the DSU.23 The issue of the cost of the
process is very controversial, especially with respect to developing countries’ ac-
cess to the system. Proposals that increase the duration and cost of the process
must, therefore, be approached with caution.
The authors state that the most signiﬁcant advantage of their Scenario 3 is that it
makes the strategic withholding of information less desirable for litigating parties.
21 See Taniguchi, ‘Understanding the Concept of Prima Facie Proof ’, p. 557.
22 See http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/paneltiming.asp.
23 See DSU Article 12.8.
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If there is no real system of preliminary motions or rulings, it would appear already
to be risky to withhold information on strategic grounds. In addition, this goal can
be realized by Panels exercising more vigorously their authority to draw appro-
priate inferences in the event of a failure or inability of a party to provide relevant
information.24 This would be preferable to introducing additional procedural or
legalistic complexities in the process.
24 See Panel Report, Turkey–Rice, para. 7.10.
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